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Fiduciary Standards and Best Interests: Should States 
Take the Lead? 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The appropriate standard of care for investment professionals in 
the United States has evolved since the passage of the Securities 
Exchange Act (“Exchange Act”)1 and the creation of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) in 1934.2  The federal government, in an 
attempt to shield the public from potential conflicts of interest in the 
investment advisory business, enacted two pieces of legislation in 1940 
to take aim at the issue:3 the Investment Company Act of 19404 and the 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940.5  Thirty-four years later, as the federal 
government sought to establish protections for the retirement savings of 
millions of Americans,6 the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
of 1974 (“ERISA”) was passed.7  Contained within ERISA are provisions 
that describe what qualifies an individual as a “fiduciary”8 and the duties, 
liabilities, and responsibilities that flow from that designation.9  A 
 
 1. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78qq (2018). 
 2. 15 U.S.C. § 78d (2018); U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, LAWS THAT GOVERN THE 
SECURITIES INDUSTRY (2013), https://www.sec.gov/answers/about-
lawsshtml.html#invadvact1940 [https://perma.cc/T6ZG-6UTP]. 
 3. See U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 2 (listing the federal statutes enacted 
over the last century to regulate and govern the securities industry). 
 4. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-64 (2018). 
 5. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (2018). 
 6. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS ADMINISTRATION, FACT SHEET: 
WHAT IS ERISA, https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/about-ebsa/our-activities/resource-
center/fact-sheets/what-is-erisa [https://perma.cc/7JLG-MA42] (describing the goals and 
importance of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974). 
 7. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–
1461 (2018). 
 8. See Fiduciary, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining the term to mean 
“a person holding the character of a trustee, or a character analogous to that of a trustee, in 
respect to the trust and confidence involved in it and the scrupulous good faith and candor 
which it requires”). 
 9. ERISA § 1002(21)(A) (laying out the events that trigger a fiduciary duty, including 
the control or management of retirement plan assets, rendering of compensated investment 
advice, or administration of a plan); § 1104(a)(1) (requiring a fiduciary to act for the sole 
benefit of the participants and beneficiaries of the retirement plan, to keep expenses 
reasonable, and to act in a prudent manner by diversifying plan assets and acting in conformity 
with the plan documents); § 1105(a) (discussing actions that could bring liability on one acting 
as a fiduciary to a retirement plan); § 1106 (prohibiting certain transactions between the 
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fiduciary, for the purposes of ERISA, must provide advice for the sole 
interest of the retirement plan participant.10   
From the passage of ERISA in 1974 until 2010, very little was 
done to alter the government’s views and interpretations of the proper 
standards of care that should apply to advisers working with retirees.11  
However, in the wake of the Great Recession, Congress decided that it 
was time to reexamine the standards of conduct that applied to 
professionals involved in the financial advisory business.12  As part of the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-
Frank”),13 Congress mandated that the SEC complete a study that would 
address concerns over the “obligations of brokers, dealers, and 
investment advisers,” as well as the regulatory environment in the 
financial advisory industry.14  Many of the concerns that triggered 
heightened scrutiny of the industry stemmed the from the events 
surrounding Bernie Madoff15 and the failure of the regulatory system in 
place at the time to protect investors from such predatory schemes.16  
Specifically, the SEC study was to examine “the standards of care for 
brokers, dealers, investment advisers . . . and persons associated with 
investment advisers for providing personalized investment advice about 
securities to retail customers that should be addressed by rule or 
statute.”17  The study recommended that the SEC promulgate a uniform 
 
retirement plan itself, the fiduciary to the plan, and the beneficiary or beneficiaries of the 
plan). 
 10. JOHN TOPOLESKI & GARY SHORTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44207, DEPARTMENT 
OF LABOR’S 2015 PROPOSED FIDUCIARY RULE: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES 4 (2016). 
 11. See generally Dawn Reiss, ERISA: Why the Fiduciary Rule Is Not a New Idea, U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REP. (Oct. 11, 2017, 11:28 AM), 
https://money.usnews.com/investing/investing-101/articles/2017-10-11/erisa-why-the-
fiduciary-rule-is-not-a-new-idea [https://perma.cc/XV2R-PUR4] (discussing how the views 
of the public and the federal government regarding the protection of retirement plans have 
evolved since the passage of ERISA). 
 12. See BAIRD WEBEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41350, THE DODD-FRANK WALL 
STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY 22 (2017) 
(detailing how Congress came to decide that it needed to scrutinize the regulatory framework 
for investor protection). 
 13. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”), Pub. 
L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 14. Dodd-Frank § 913(b), 124 Stat. at 1824. 
 15. See Amir Efrati, Tom Lauricella, & Dionne Searcey, Top Broker Accused of $50 
Billion Fraud, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 12, 2008, 11:59 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122903010173099377 [https://perma.cc/HR4Q-YWX5] 
(describing the allegations surrounding Madoff and his securities firm). 
 16. WEBEL, supra note 12, at 22. 
 17. Dodd-Frank § 913(b)(2), 124 Stat. at 1824. 
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fiduciary standard that would be applicable to both investment advisers 
and to broker-dealers.18  The SEC has never acted on this specific 
recommendation.19 
Questions over the scope and reach of the fiduciary standard led 
the Department of Labor (“DOL”) in 2010 to propose a rule that took aim 
at conflicts of interest for financial advisers providing guidance to 
investors on retirement accounts.20  However, due to push back from the 
financial industry, the proposed reform of the fiduciary interpretation was 
delayed until 2015, at which time the DOL proposed a revised version of 
the rule.21  The final DOL “fiduciary rule,”22 issued in April 2016, was a 
culmination of years of political and policy debate over who should be 
subject to a fiduciary standard and how the standard would be applied 
moving forward.23 
With the election of Donald Trump in 2016, the fate of the 
fiduciary rule was thrown into question, as speculation mounted that the 
incoming Trump Administration would seek to either delay or completely 
repeal the fiduciary rule.24  That speculation was confirmed in February 
 
 18. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISORS AND BROKER-
DEALERS 101 (2011). 
 19. WEBEL, supra note 12, at 22. 
 20. See Stephen Miller, DOL Issues New Proposed Rule on Investment Advice, SHRM 
(Feb. 26, 2010), https://www.shrm.org/ResourcesAndTools/hr-
topics/benefits/Pages/AdviceRuleRedux.aspx [https://perma.cc/3TJR-9PTN] (describing the 
2010 rollout of the Obama Administration’s proposed changes to the standards governing 
retirement plan advisers). 
 21. See Janet L. Luxton & Gene Paranczak, Regulatory Brief: The Final DOL Fiduciary 
Rule: What It Means to Plan Sponsors, VANGUARD (Aug. 2016), 
https://institutional.vanguard.com/iam/pdf/FIDRULPA.pdf?cbdForceDomain=false 
[https://perma.cc/3D2Z-3GP5] (analyzing the newly released fiduciary rule). 
 22. Definition of the Term ‘‘Fiduciary’’; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement 
Investment Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. 20946, 20946 (Apr. 8, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. 
pts. 2509, 2510, 2550). 
 23. See Ian Salisbury, A Huge Change Is About to Hit Wall Street, MONEY (Apr. 6, 2016), 
http://money.com/money/4281293/fiduciary-rule-standard-retirement/ 
[https://perma.cc/H2ZR-C2DF] (looking at the path to the fiduciary rule and some of the early 
reactions from Wall Street and consumers). 
 24. See Anthony Scaramucci, Your 401(k) Doesn’t Need a Federal Babysitter, WALL ST. 
J. (Nov. 1, 2016, 7:17 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/your-401-k-doesnt-need-a-federal-
babysitter-1478042244 [https://perma.cc/NR4L-KWXN] (discussing Scaramucci’s criticisms 
of the fiduciary rule); Sarah N. Lynch, Retirement Plan Offered by Trump Pick Puzder Sheds 
Light on Labor Rule, REUTERS (Dec. 9, 2016, 2:51 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
usa-trump-fiduciary/retirement-plan-offered-by-trump-pick-puzder-sheds-light-on-labor-
rule-idUSKBN13Y2GS [https://perma.cc/ND7U-T5RP] (speculating on prospective 
Secretary of Labor Andy Puzder’s views of the fiduciary rule). 
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2017 when President Trump issued an executive order25 instructing the 
DOL to review the fiduciary rule and perform an updated economic and 
legal analysis of its impact.26  The Trump Administration followed the 
executive order by repeatedly delaying the implementation of the 
fiduciary rule27 until March 2018, when the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated the fiduciary rule in its entirety.28  
The DOL, then headed by a Trump appointee, declined to defend the 
fiduciary rule further and appeal the Fifth Circuit’s ruling to the United 
States Supreme Court.29  Consequently, the ultimate fate of the Obama-
era fiduciary rule seemed to be sealed.30 
The demise of the fiduciary rule triggered a series of new 
governmental actions across numerous agencies at both the state and 
federal levels.31  Most significantly, the SEC issued a new package of 
investor protection regulations, which effectively equated to a revision of 
the federal fiduciary rule.32  Several states also proposed or implemented 
new rules governing the standards which investment professionals must 
adhere in their business with clients.33  This new combination of 
competing regulations, in addition to the lingering confusion from the 
 
 25. Memorandum on the Fiduciary Duty Rule, 2017 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 95 (Feb. 
3, 2017), reprinted in 82 Fed. Reg. 9675, 9675–76 (Feb. 7, 2017). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Jim Pavia, Trump Delays Controversial Fiduciary Rule for Advisors, CNBC (Feb. 3, 
2017, 1:37 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/02/03/trump-delays-controversial-fiduciary-
rule-for-advisors.html [https://perma.cc/6JXP-8LUT]; Lisa Beilfuss, Labor Department 
Seeks 18-Month Delay in Fiduciary Rule, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 9, 2017, 5:23 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/labor-department-seeks-18-month-delay-in-fiduciary-rule-
1502305970 [https://perma.cc/T2LW-939B]. 
 28. U.S. Chamber of Commerce v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 885 F.3d 360, 388 (5th Cir. 
2018). 
 29. Tara Siegel Bernard, Obama-Era Investor Protection Rule is Dead, N.Y. TIMES, June 
22, 2018, at B3 (“The department did not try to defend the rule after the appeals court’s initial 
decision, experts said, and it let a deadline pass to petition the Supreme Court to hear the 
case.”). 
 30. See id. (discussing the demise of the fiduciary rule in the federal courts). 
 31. See Sarah O’Brien, SEC’s New Investor Protection Rule Won’t End the Fiduciary 
Debate, CNBC (July 30, 2019, 8:15 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/30/sec-new-
investor-protection-rule-wont-end-the-fiduciary-debate.html [https://perma.cc/J4LZ-3Z97] 
(“The multi-tentacled tug-of-war [over investor protection laws] is likely to persist.”). 
 32. Regulation Best Interest: The Broker-Dealer Standard of Conduct, 84 Fed. Reg. 
33318, 33318 (July 12, 2019) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). 
 33. John Manganaro, State-Based Fiduciary Regulations Take Shape in 2019, 
PLANADVISER (Jan. 24, 2019), https://www.planadviser.com/exclusives/state-based-
fiduciary-regulations-take-shape-2019/ [https://perma.cc/NPE4-9SQG]. 
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fiduciary rule’s brief existence, has produced a significant amount of 
uncertainty in the investment advice industry.34 
This Note proceeds in six parts.  Part II delves into the portion of 
ERISA that deals directly with the fiduciary standard and how it 
originally applied to financial advisers.35  Part III reviews the Obama 
Administration’s fiduciary rule, its rationale, and the reaction to the rule 
from industry and consumer advocates.36  Part IV analyzes the new SEC 
rules package, the early reaction to it, and its potential fate as a result of 
pending litigation.37  Part V examines the patchwork of state regulations 
that have arisen in the past few years.38  Part VI concludes by 
recommending that the federal government rethink its level of 
involvement in the regulation of the financial advisory industry.39 
II.  THE ORIGINAL FIDUCIARY STANDARD SET FORTH IN ERISA 
When the Obama Administration announced in 2015 that it 
intended to promulgate a new investor protection rule, the Administration 
singled out ERISA and its outdated provisions,40 pointing to the seismic 
transformation that had taken place in America’s retirement system since 
the law’s passage in 1974.41  Under ERISA, a person is deemed to be a 
fiduciary regarding a retirement plan if he or she maintains any direct 
control over the management, disposition, or administration of the plan’s 
assets or “renders investment advice for a fee or other compensation”42 
regarding the plan and its assets.43  The DOL responded to the passage of 
ERISA by implementing a five-part test to determine whether or not a 
 
 34. John Manganaro, Fog Still Hangs Over Defunct DOL Fiduciary Rule’s Influence, 
PLANADVISER (June 25, 2019), https://www.planadviser.com/fog-still-hangs-defunct-dol-
fiduciary-rules-influence/ [https://perma.cc/4R93-QVSD]. 
 35. See infra Part II. 
 36. See infra Part III. 
 37. See infra Part IV. 
 38. See infra Part V. 
 39. See infra Part VI. 
 40. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 
1002(21)(A) (2018) (setting forth ERISA’s criteria to qualify as a fiduciary). 
 41. Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: Middle Class Economics: Strengthening 
Retirement Security by Cracking Down on Backdoor Payments and Hidden Fees (Feb. 23, 
2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/23/fact-sheet-middle-
class-economics-strengthening-retirement-security-crac [https://perma.cc/4A6Q-5KDE]. 
 42. ERISA § 1002(21)(A). 
 43. Id. 
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person had, in fact, provided “investment advice” for the purposes of 
triggering the fiduciary standard of care.44 
First, a person must have provided advice or recommendations 
regarding securities or other appreciable property.45  Second, that person 
must have provided the necessary type of advice on a “regular basis.”46  
Third, the advice must have been rendered in accord with an 
understanding between the fiduciary and the person seeking advice.47  
Fourth, the advice provided must have served as the “primary basis for 
investment decisions” regarding the plan assets.48  Finally, the advice 
must have been individualized for the participant in the plan.49  The last 
four prongs of the test confused financial professionals and investors 
alike for decades.50  The second and fourth prongs were the two 
components that were the most heavily targeted by the fiduciary rule.51  
At the time of ERISA’s passage, the dominant retirement savings 
vehicle in the United States was the defined benefit pension plan.52  In 
these types of retirement plans, the employer sponsors the plan, bears the 
risk of the plan’s investment returns, and promises the participants in the 
plan either a fixed dollar amount per pay period or an amount to be 
determined through a plan formula.53  Over time, however, the retirement 
market experienced a vast swing to defined contribution plans,54 in which 
 
 44. Susan P. Serota & Kathleen D. Bardunias, Take Two: DOL Reproposes Changes to 
Definition of Fiduciary for ERISA Plans and IRAs, PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN 
(May 8, 2015), 
https://www.pillsburylaw.com/images/content/6/5/v2/65729/AdvisoryMay2015ECBTakeT
woDOLReproposesChangestoDefinitionofFiduc.pdf [https://perma.cc/AQK8-EEDG]. 
 45. Definition of “Fiduciary,” 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-21(j)(1)(i)(A) (West 2017). 
 46. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-21(j)(1)(i)(B)(2) (emphasis added). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. (emphasis added). 
 49. Id. 
 50. See generally David C. Kaleda, Department of Labor’s Proposal to Define 
“Investment Advice,” THE INV. LAW., Oct. 2015, at 1 (examining the sections of ERISA which 
the fiduciary ruled aimed to change). 
 51. See Serota & Bardunias, supra note 44 (discussing the changes to the “regular basis” 
and “primary basis for investment decisions” prongs). 
 52. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 
1002(35)(B) (2018) (defining defined benefit plans “as a pension plan other than an individual 
account plan and . . . [one that] shall be treated as an individual account plan to the extent 
benefits are based upon the separate account of a participant and as a defined benefit plan 
with respect to the remaining portion of benefits under the plan”). 
 53. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, TYPES OF RETIREMENT PLANS, 
https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/retirement/typesofplans [https://perma.cc/7578-SAGB]. 
 54. See ERISA § 1002(34) (defining defined contribution plans as “a pension plan which 
provides for an individual account for each participant and for benefits based solely upon the 
amount contributed to the participant’s account, and any income, expenses, gains and losses, 
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the employee bears the investment risk of the plan’s assets and will 
ultimately have at his or her disposal only the assets in his or her 
particular account in the plan, not a promised amount from the 
employer.55  In 2012, it was estimated that nearly 70% of private-sector 
retirees held their assets in these defined contribution plans, up from 26% 
in 1975.56  It was this shift in retirement savings vehicles, in addition to 
the explosion of growth in the number of retirees using the Individual 
Retirement Account (“IRA”)57 that formed the basis for the Obama 
Administration’s efforts to alter the investment advisory regulatory 
landscape.58 
III.  THE FIDUCIARY RULE 
On February 23, 2015, President Obama delivered a speech to the 
AARP59 in which he expressed his desire for the DOL to change federal 
regulations to require financial advisers to place the needs of their clients 
before the advisers’ own financial interests.60  Obama pointed to the  need 
to take aim at incentives provided to financial advisers by their 
employers, such as backdoor payments and hidden fees.61  On the same 
day, the Council of Economic Advisers released an economic analysis 
 
and any forfeitures of accounts of other participants which may be allocated to such 
participant’s account”). 
 55. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 53. 
 56. TOPOLESKI & SHORTER, supra note 10, at 12. 
 57. Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 408(a) (2018) (“[T]he term ‘individual 
retirement account’ means a trust created or organized in the United States for the exclusive 
benefit of an individual or his beneficiaries . . . .”). 
 58. See TOPOLESKI & SHORTER, supra note 10, at 12 (pointing to the $17 billion lost by 
IRA investors per year due to conflicted investment advice and lack of regulatory safeguards). 
 59. The AARP, formally known as the American Association of Retired Persons, is an 
interest group whose stated mission “is to empower people to choose how they live as they 
age.” About AARP, AARP, https://www.aarp.org/about-aarp/ [https://perma.cc/2YBV-
CZGT] (last visited Jan. 6, 2020). 
 60. Press Release, The White House, Remarks by the President at the AARP (Feb. 23, 
2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/23/remarks-
president-aarp  [https://perma.cc/J7HK-36XJ] (“If you are working hard, if you’re putting 
away money, if you’re sacrificing that new car or that vacation so that you can build a nest 
egg for later, you should have the peace of mind of knowing that the advice you’re getting for 
investing those dollars is sound, that your investments are protected, that you’re not being 
taken advantage of . . .  There are a lot of very fine financial advisors out there, but there are 
also financial advisors who receive backdoor payments or hidden fees for steering people into 
bad retirement investments that have high fees and low returns. So what happens is these 
payments, these inducements incentivize the broker to make recommendations that generate 
the best returns for them, but not necessarily the best returns for you.”). 
 61. Id. 
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titled “The Effects of Conflicted Investment Advice on Retirement 
Savings,” supplying data in support of the Obama Administration’s push 
to rewrite the rules governing financial advice.62  The study’s key 
findings were that, due to conflicted advice, retirees experienced roughly 
a 1% reduction in investment returns and added costs of $17 billion.63  
The report focused in particular on the IRA market and the lower 
regulatory standard for investment professionals when providing advice 
on how to execute IRA rollovers.64  An IRA rollover is the process by 
which an investor moves his or her retirement account from either an 
employer-sponsored retirement plan or an existing IRA into a new IRA.65  
Because the IRA rollover is a one-time financial transaction, the advice 
rendered regarding the rollover did not meet the “regular basis” prong of 
the 1975 regulations.66  By extension, this meant that financial advisers 
who provided guidance on IRA rollovers were not subject to a fiduciary 
standard of care.67   
In response to the request from President Obama, on April 6, 
2016, then-Secretary of Labor Tom Perez announced the completion of 
the fiduciary rule.68  Two days later, the final rule was published in the 
Federal Register.69  The remainder of this Part examines the main 
 
 62. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE EFFECTS OF 
CONFLICTED INVESTMENT ADVICE ON RETIREMENT SAVINGS (2015), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/cea_coi_report_final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZJM9-KA2X] [hereinafter CEA REPORT]. 
 63. Id. at 2. 
 64. Id. at 3 (“The average IRA rollover for individuals 55 to 64 in 2012 was more than 
$100,000; losing 12 percent from conflicted advice has the same effect on feasible future 
withdrawals as if $12,000 was lost in the transfer.”). 
 65. Julia Kagan, IRA Rollover, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/ira-rollover.asp [https://perma.cc/97XE-LNE2] (last 
updated Apr. 29, 2019). 
 66. Brad Campbell & Joshua Waldbeser, Old Standard, New Day: The Death of the 
Fiduciary Rule Doesn’t Mean That Broker-Dealers Won’t Be Fiduciaries, DRINKER BIDDLE 
& REATH (May 22, 2018), http://www.brokerdealerlawblog.com/2018/old-standard-new-
day-the-death-of-the-fiduciary-rule-doesnt-mean-that-broker-dealers-wont-be-fiduciaries/ 
[https://perma.cc/45A2-Y2TV]. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See Melanie Waddell, Perez: Final DOL Fiduciary Rule Includes Big Changes to 
Deadlines, BICE, THINKADVISER (Apr. 6, 2016, 2:10 AM), 
https://www.thinkadvisor.com/2016/04/06/perez-final-dol-fiduciary-rule-includes-big-
change/ [https://perma.cc/T448-LWRS] (detailing the final fiduciary rule’s provisions and 
scheduled implementation date). 
 69. Definition of the Term ‘‘Fiduciary’’; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement 
Investment Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. 20946, 20946 (Apr. 8, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. 
pts. 2509, 2510, 2550). 
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changes that were to be made to existing federal law under the fiduciary 
rule. 
A. Replacement of the “Five-Part Test” to Qualify as a Fiduciary 
Instead of laying out required actions that must be taken for an 
adviser to trigger the fiduciary standard of care, the fiduciary rule set forth 
a list of investment-related actions which, if committed in exchange for a 
fee or commission, would qualify as “investment advice” and subject the 
adviser to the fiduciary standard.70  With a few exclusions,71 any 
recommendation regarding the acquisition, holding of, or disposal of 
investment property or securities and how investment property or 
securities should be rolled over, transferred, or taken out of an employer-
sponsored retirement plan or an existing IRA would constitute investment 
advice.72  In addition, any recommendations regarding the actual 
investment strategy, asset allocation, portfolio makeup, or selection of 
type of investment account, along with how an existing IRA should be 
managed for planning purposes, would be considered investment 
advice.73 
The fiduciary rule also required that the person providing the 
advice have either (a) represented himself as a fiduciary under the ERISA 
or the Internal Revenue Code, (b) provided the advice in accord with an 
oral or written agreement or an understanding that the advice was 
provided to help the individual needs of the plan participant, or (c) 
directed tailored advice to a participant in relation to assets contained 
within a retirement plan or IRA.74  
B. Exceptions to Actions That Would Ordinarily Trigger Fiduciary 
 
 70. See TOPOLESKI & SHORTER, supra note 10, at 8–9 (2016) (providing a list of activities 
that would and would not trigger the fiduciary standard of care). 
 71. See Definition of the Term ‘‘Fiduciary’’; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement 
Investment Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. at 20972 (listing exclusions such as assistance provided by 
platform providers such as assistants to fiduciaries; general communications between advisers 
or their companies and clients, such as newsletters or television programs; and most forms of 
investment education provided to clients). 
 72. See Definition of the Term ‘‘Fiduciary’’; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement 
Investment Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. at 20948 (listing forms of advice that qualify as investment 
advice for purposes of the fiduciary rule). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
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Status 
If an investment adviser had any communication with a person 
the fiduciary rule deemed to be a “counterparty,”75 then the adviser was 
permitted to proceed under the reasonable belief that these types of  
sophisticated financial professionals would be able to make the 
investment decisions discussed on their own.76  Another exemption to 
fiduciary status occurred when an adviser provided advice regarding 
swaps and derivative dealings, in accordance with certain procedures.77  
Finally, the fiduciary rule exempted employees of retirement plan 
sponsors or their affiliates who offered advice to fiduciary advisers or 
plan participants from qualifying as fiduciaries themselves, provided they 
did not receive any additional compensation for their advice.78 
C. The Best Interest Contract Exemption 
The component of the fiduciary rule that generated considerable 
debate among academics79 and heightened scrutiny from the financial 
industry as a whole was the “best interest contract prohibited transaction 
exemption” (“BIC Exemption”).80  The BIC Exemption allowed financial 
advisers to make recommendations that could potentially violate a 
fiduciary standard if specific regulatory requirements were met.81  This 
exemption was included to provide broker-dealers a way forward in the 
 
 75. See id. (providing that the list of carved out counterparties included “broker-dealers, 
registered investment advisers, banks, insurance companies . . . or plan fiduciaries who have 
at least $50 million under management”). 
 76. See id. (“At the same time, however, as the Department acknowledged in the 
proposal, the broad test could sweep in some relationships that are not appropriately regarded 
as fiduciary in nature . . . .”). 
 77. See id. at 20985 (listing the requirements to avoid being deemed a fiduciary in a swap 
transaction to include the person not be acting as the adviser to the subject plan, there must 
be an “independent plan fiduciary” representing the plan, etc.). 
 78. See id. at 20986 (defining the scope of the employee/affiliate exception). 
 79. See generally Quinn Curtis, The Fiduciary Rule Controversy and the Future of 
Investment Advice (Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper Series 2018-04, 
2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3121708 
[https://perma.cc/2QTP-M3GE] (arguing that the BIC Exemption is flawed in its design). 
 80. See Definition of the Term ‘‘Fiduciary’’; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement 
Investment Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. at 20946–47 (introducing the BIC Exemption). 
 81. See id. at 20991 (“[The BIC Exemption] require[s], among other things, that 
investment advice fiduciaries adhere to certain Impartial Conduct Standards, which are 
fundamental obligations of fair dealing and fiduciary conduct, and include obligations to act 
in the customer’s best interest, avoid misleading statements, and receive no more than 
reasonable compensation.”). 
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changing regulatory environment.82  Because broker-dealers, unlike 
investment advisers,83 conduct business on a transaction-by-transaction 
basis, they had previously not fallen under the 1975 regulations that 
imposed a fiduciary duty on the financial professionals who did satisfy 
the five-prong test.84 
The BIC Exemption required that financial institutions 
“acknowledge fiduciary status for itself and its Advisers.”85  The BIC 
Exemption imposed upon institutions several additional requirements 
when dealing with retirees: (1) prudent advice in the best interest of the 
retiree; (2) charging  reasonable compensation; (3) a promise to avoid 
making misleading statements concerning the investments; (4) the 
implementation of policies to discourage violations of the required 
standards of conduct; (5) the avoidance of improper incentives for 
financial representatives; and (6) the fair disclosure of all relevant 
information surrounding advice.86  The acknowledgment of the 
requirements must be in writing prior to any advice or recommendations 
being made.87  Crucially, the BIC Exemption provided a private remedy 
for IRA investors,88 which created a legal right of action against financial 
 
 82. See Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. and Fin. Advisors (“NAIFA”), The Best 
Interest Contract Exemption (June 2015), 
https://www.naifa.org/NAIFA/media/GovRel/issuefed/The-Best-Interest-Contract-
Exemption.pdf [https://perma.cc/CR8R-WDTS] (“The BIC exemption, while intended as a 
way to allow continuation of the broker-dealer/registered representative model for providing 
investment advice . . . .”); Ryan Fuhrmann, Suitability vs. Fiduciary Standards: What’s the 
Difference?, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/professionaleducation/11/suitability-fiduciary-
standards.asp [https://perma.cc/RAQ6-Z4YN] (last updated Sept. 9, 2019) (describing how 
the suitability standard, the prior standard to which broker-dealers were held differs from the 
newly imposed fiduciary standard). 
 83. See Pete Woodring, Know the Difference Between a Broker and a Registered 
Investment Adviser, KIPLINGER (Sept. 22, 2015), 
https://www.kiplinger.com/article/investing/T023-C032-S014-the-difference-between-a-
broker-and-an-adviser.html [https://perma.cc/K934-4PSN] (discussing how investment 
advisers such as Registered Investment Advisers (RIAs) generally offer a broader array of 
services to consumers, such as investment, insurance, education, and retirement planning and 
are usually compensated in the form of a fee based on the amount of assets under his or her 
management). 
 84. See Campbell & Waldbeser, supra note 66 (describing the shifting regulatory 
environment for broker-dealers under the fiduciary rule). 
 85. Best Interest Contract Exemption, 81 Fed. Reg. 21002, 21003 (Apr. 8, 2016) (to be 
codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2550). 
 86. Id. at 21007. 
 87. Id. at 21003. 
 88. Id. at 21008; see Joshua Waldbeser & Jamie Helman, The DOL’s Best Interest 
Contract Requirement: Effect on Litigation Against Broker-Dealers, DRINKER BIDDLE & 
REATH (Oct. 28, 2017), http://www.brokerdealerlawblog.com/2017/dols-best-interest-
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advisers and institutions in the event that the BIC Exemption was 
allegedly violated.89 
D. Reactions to the Fiduciary Rule 
There was a wide disparity in the reaction to the proposed and 
final fiduciary rules, both on Capitol Hill and between pro-consumer90 
and pro-business groups.91  Senator and 2020 presidential candidate 
Elizabeth Warren, one of the fiercest proponents of the fiduciary rule, 
pointed to what she perceived as the main source of conflicted advice 
being given to investors by financial advisers: kickbacks, prizes, bonuses, 
and other awards offered by financial services companies that would be 
triggered by the advisers’ meeting such things as sales quotas and 
benchmarks.92  Warren asserted that the fiduciary rule would force the 
financial industry to stop these practices and to stop hiding these potential 
rewards for advisers deep in the pages of product prospectuses.93  She 
believed that, without government intervention, the industry would not 
 
contract-requirement-effect-litigation-broker-dealers/ [https://perma.cc/J9T8-J6R5] 
(describing how ERISA-covered plans did not require anything like the BIC Exemption 
because there are already legal remedies for breach of fiduciary duties in those plans). 
 89. Waldbeser & Helman, supra note 88. 
 90. See Darla Mercado, How the New ‘Fiduciary’ Rule Will Actually Affect You, CNBC 
(Oct. 13, 2016, 10:33 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/10/13/how-the-new-fiduciary-rule-
will-actually-affect-you.html [https://perma.cc/4RGC-BRLS] (“‘The Department of Labor 
has done what the Securities and Exchange Commission is unable to do: create an enforceable 
best interest standard and rein in conflicts that aren’t in the best interest of the investor,’ said 
Barbara Roper, director of investor protection at the Washington, D.C.-based Consumer 
Federation of America.”). 
 91. See Tim Devaney, Chamber Waging Lobbying Battle Over Investment Rule, THE 
HILL (Mar. 7, 2016, 3:24 PM) https://thehill.com/regulation/labor/272079-chamber-waging-
lobbying-battle-over-investment-rule [https://perma.cc/ZFS4-BMHA] (looking at the 
concerted effort led by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce to fight back against what it perceived 
as negative effects of the fiduciary rule). 
 92. OFFICE OF SENATOR ELIZABETH WARREN, VILLAS, CASTLES, AND VACATIONS: 
AMERICANS’ NEW PROTECTIONS FROM FINANCIAL ADVISER KICKBACKS, HIGH FEES, & 
COMMISSIONS ARE AT RISK 4 (2017 ed.), 
https://www.warren.senate.gov/files/documents/2017-2-3_Warren_DOL_Rule_Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/G4RA-UZ29] (“The Conflict of Interest Rule put in place by DOL will put 
a stop to these harmful kickbacks. The new rule prohibits financial firms from compensating 
their advisers in ways that encourage and reward them for making recommendations that are 
not in their clients’ best interest.”). 
 93. Id. 
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end these practices on its own.94  Many of her fellow Democratic 
politicians shared her favorable views of the fiduciary rule.95 
On the other hand, Republicans held much more skeptical views 
of the fiduciary rule.96  Then-Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, 
Orrin Hatch, echoed his Republican colleagues in voicing concern that 
the fiduciary rule would force financial advisers into an environment with 
higher compliance costs and reduce the number of choices in advisers and 
investment products that would be available to everyday investors.97  
These assertions were mirrored by financial advisers who, under the new 
regulations, were placed at a greater risk of class-action litigation.98  
Advisers were also concerned that, with the forced move away from 
commission-style payments, which the Obama Administration viewed as 
generating conflicts of interest,99 small investors would be effectively 
forced out of the market for financial advice because a fee on an account 
with a small investable balance would not be worth an adviser’s time and 
energy.100 
 
 94. Id. 
 95. Bobby Scott, Maxine Waters, & Elijah Cummings, Time to Curb High Fees on 
Retirement Accounts, CNBC (Apr. 14, 2016, 10:45 AM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2016/04/14/time-to-curb-high-fees-on-retirement-accounts-
commentary.html [https://perma.cc/CYR6-A6VT] (discussing commentary by Bobby Scott, 
Maxine Waters, and Elijah Cummings, members of the U.S. House of Representatives and 
the top Democrats on the committees on Education and the Workforce, Financial Services, 
and Oversight and Government Reform, respectively). 
 96. Representative Phil Roe (R-TN), the Chairman of the House Subcommittee on 
Health, Employment, Labor, and Pensions stated the following: “[The] new regulatory 
scheme will hinder access to retirement advice for low- and middle-income families and make 
it harder for small businesses to help their employees plan for retirement . . . .” Melanie 
Waddell, GOP Fights to Block DOL Fiduciary Rule, THINKADVISOR (Apr. 19, 2016, 9:21 
AM), https://www.thinkadvisor.com/2016/04/19/gop-fights-to-block-dol-fiduciary-
rule/?t=riasrefchannel-more-news [https://perma.cc/D2AF-QDMT].  Representative Ann 
Wagner (R-MO) stated the following: “[The new rule] hurts those it claims to protect: low- 
and middle-income families who are looking for sound investment advice in the midst of a 
savings crisis.  The unquestionably flawed rule raises costs, limits choices and restricts access 
to investments for hardworking Americans.”  Id. 
 97. Press Release, Office of Senator Orrin Hatch, Hatch Statement of DOL Fiduciary 
Rule (Apr. 6, 2016), https://www.finance.senate.gov/chairmans-news/hatch-statement-on-
dol-fiduciary-rule [https://perma.cc/45J9-PCWZ]. 
 98. See Liz Skinner, The DOL Fiduciary Rule Will Forever Change Financial Advice, 
and the Industry Has to Adapt, INVESTMENTNEWS (June 9, 2016, 11:34 AM), 
https://www.investmentnews.com/article/20160509/FEATURE/160509939 
[https://perma.cc/874B-E7D9] (describing the potential litigation facing advisers under the 
fiduciary rule). 
 99. CEA REPORT, supra note 62, at 2. 
 100. Brad Allen, Advisers Do the Math on Fiduciary Rule Compliance, STARTRIBUNE 
(Apr. 29, 2017, 2:00 PM), http://www.startribune.com/advisers-do-the-math-on-fiduciary-
rule-compliance/420548943/ [https://perma.cc/X4JD-SRT3] (“[M]oving away from 
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In June 2016, a collection of financial industry advocacy groups, 
spearheaded by the United States Chamber of Commerce, sued101  the 
DOL.102  The groups cited many of the same reasons as the Republicans 
on Capitol Hill, pointing to what they perceived to be the fiduciary rule’s 
whittling away of the investment selections that would be available for 
financial advisers to offer their clients and what would effectively be a 
cloud of potential legal liability hanging over all future interactions 
between advisers and clients.103  
This litigation culminated in the Fifth Circuit’s decision to vacate 
the entire fiduciary rule in March 2018.104  First, the court held that the 
fiduciary rule conflicted with federal law, that the DOL misinterpreted 
“investment advice fiduciary” to be ambiguous,105 and that this 
interpretation of fiduciary would disrupt the uniform application of the 
word “fiduciary” through the ERISA law.106  Second, the court held that 
the policy argument for the need to modernize ERISA for the better 
protection of today’s retirement investors was one that should be 
addressed by Congress, not the executive branch.107  Finally, the court 
held that the fiduciary rule did not satisfy the requirements set forth by 
the Chevron108 doctrine.109  Specifically, the court held that the fiduciary 
rule violated step two of the doctrine, which requires courts to determine 
“whether [or not] Congress intended to delegate interpretive authority 
over a question to the agency asserting deference” regarding an 
ambiguous portion(s) of a statute.110  In pointing to the many 
 
commissions would leave smaller investors without access to financial advice, since a 
percentage fee on a small account would not justify an adviser’s time.”). 
 101. Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America v. Hugler, 231 F. Supp. 3d 
152 (N.D. Tex. 2017). 
 102. Monica C. Meinert, Industry Groups Sue DOL over Fiduciary Rule, ABA BANKING 
J. (June 2, 2016), https://bankingjournal.aba.com/2016/06/industry-groups-sue-dol-over-
fiduciary-rule/ [https://perma.cc/B3KR-7PJE]. 
 103. See id. (laying out the concerns of the financial industry and how the potential liability 
could restrict interactions with consumers). 
 104. Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 885 
F.3d 360, 369 (5th Cir. 2018); Lisa Beilfuss, Fiduciary Rule Dealt Blow by Circuit Court 
Ruling, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 15, 2018, 9:48 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/fiduciary-rule-
dealt-blow-by-circuit-court-ruling-1521164915?mod=article_inline [https://perma.cc/8F32-
P63V]. 
 105. U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 885 F.3d at 369. 
 106. Id. at 376–78. 
 107. Id. at 378–79. 
 108. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (laying 
out the test that has formed the foundation for the boundaries of administrative deference). 
 109. U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 885 F.3d at 379–80. 
 110. Id. at 387. 
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administrative flaws it perceived in the fiduciary rule, the court concluded 
that the fiduciary rule possessed “hallmarks of ‘unreasonableness’ under 
Chevron Step Two and [constituted] arbitrary and capricious exercises of 
administrative power.”111 
Crucially for the financial industry, the court took aim at the 
fiduciary rule’s portions that relate to legal liability on the part of advisers 
and their financial institutions.112  The court criticized the fiduciary rule 
for its attempted creation of vehicles for private litigation through the BIC 
Exemption contracts.113  The court pointed to the need for Congress to 
authorize a private right of action, which it did for ERISA-qualified 
retirement plans through the enactment of ERISA itself but did not for 
plans such as IRAs.114  The elimination of the fiduciary rule set the stage 
for the SEC to step in with its own solution to address the issue of 
conflicted retirement advice.115 
IV.  THE SEC BEST INTEREST PACKAGE 
On June 5, 2019, the SEC formally announced that it had voted 
in favor of a new package (“SEC package”) of investor protection 
regulations.116 
A. General Overview of SEC Package 
The SEC package centers around the difference in regulatory 
standards between a broker-dealer, governed under the Exchange Act,117 
and an investment adviser, governed under the Investment Advisers Act 
 
 111. Id. at 388. 
 112. See id. at 384 (“[T]he BICE provisions regarding lawsuits also violate the separation 
of powers . . . .”). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See Dave Michaels, Brokers Will Have to Reveal More to Investors Under Coming 
SEC Rule, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 15 2018, 1:05 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/brokers-will-
have-to-reveal-more-to-investors-under-coming-sec-rule-
1521133534?mod=searchresults&page=1&pos=1&mod=article_inline 
[https://perma.cc/XYY7-4YYU] (speculating on the SEC’s plans for a new regulatory 
framework to replace the fiduciary rule). 
 116. Press Release, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, SEC Adopts Rules and Interpretations 
to Enhance Protections and Preserve Choice for Retail Investors in Their Relationships with 
Financial Professionals (June 5, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2019-89 
[https://perma.cc/38VV-P8SR]. 
 117. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78qq (2018). 
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of 1940.118  The SEC aims to assure the investor that he or she is receiving 
information that is in the investor’s “best interest,” not in the financial 
interests of the broker, adviser, or financial firm.119  The SEC package 
identifies the same problems that the fiduciary rule sought to eliminate: 
inherent conflicts of interest in the financial advising process emanating 
from the commission-based compensation structure.120 
However, in a sharp deviation from the view that the Obama 
Administration held of the commission-based compensation structure,121 
under the direction of President Trump-appointed Chairman Jay Clayton, 
the SEC sought a more balanced approach between the concerns of 
investors and the financial advisory industry.122  The SEC pointed to the 
positive impacts that the commission-based compensation structure has 
had on the industry, such as the typical example of the investor seeking 
only a one-time investment and holding it for a number of years.123  That 
investor benefits from the commission structure because he or she saves 
money through not having to pay fees on a balance that was not being 
actively traded or managed.124  Additionally, for many consumers with 
small amounts of investable assets, the commission structure provides the 
only possible access to investment advice because many fee-based 
 
 118. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (2018). 
 119. See Regulation Best Interest: The Broker-Dealer Standard of Conduct, 84 Fed. Reg. 
33318, 33319 (July 12, 2019) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) (requiring that “broker-
dealers . . . [a]ct in the best interest of the retail customer at the time the recommendation is 
made, without placing the financial or other interest of the broker-dealer ahead of the interests 
of the retail customer . . . .”). 
 120. Id. 
 121. See Liz Skinner, Figuring out Fiduciary: Now Comes the Hard Part, 
INVESTMENTNEWS (May 9, 2016), 
https://www.investmentnews.com/article/20160509/FEATURE/160509939/the-dol-
fiduciary-rule-will-forever-change-financial-advice-and-the [https://perma.cc/5NHQ-D6GA] 
(asserting that the fiduciary rule’s BIC Exemption, while not outright banning commissions, 
would have forced the financial adviser to earn “reasonable” compensation only, in addition 
to its other disclosure requirements; also that the sale of high-commission annuity products 
was expected to decrease under the fiduciary rule). 
 122. See Regulation Best Interest: The Broker-Dealer Standard of Conduct, 84 Fed. Reg. 
at 33319 (“[T]he relationship between a broker-dealer and a customer has inherent conflicts 
of interest, including those resulting from a transaction-based (e.g., commission) 
compensation structure and other broker-dealer compensation . . . Notwithstanding these 
inherent conflicts of interest in the broker-dealer-customer relationship, there is broad 
acknowledgement of the benefits of, and support for, the continuing existence of the broker-
dealer business model . . . .”). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
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advisers125 require a minimum amount to be invested before entering into 
a professional advisory relationship.126 
B. Component of the SEC Package  
The SEC package centers on “Regulation Best Interest,” which 
includes the regulation’s “General Obligation” for broker-dealers.127  The 
General Obligation requires four components: (1) a “Disclosure 
Obligation,” (2) a “Care Obligation,” (3) a “Conflict of Interest 
Obligation,” and (4) a “Compliance Obligation.”128  The package also 
contains “Form CRS,”129 a new requirement defining relationships with 
broker-dealers and investment advisers and their clients, along with two 
new interpretations of the fiduciary duty.130 
1.  Disclosure Obligation 
The broker-dealer must disclose: its title as a broker-dealer in 
dealings with a client, the scope of the broker-dealer’s relationship with 
the client, the material costs and fees that the client will incur, and any 
possible conflicts of interest that might come between the broker-dealer’s 
acting in the client’s best interest.131 
 
 125. In other words, the adviser gets paid a percentage of assets under management 
(“AUM”) instead of receiving a commission on the purchase of an investment product. Roger 
Wohlner, What You Need to Know About Fee-Only Financial Advisors, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/102014/feeonly-financial-advisers-what-
you-need-know.asp [https://perma.cc/X8W7-HV3C] (last updated Oct. 14, 2019). 
 126. See Regulation Best Interest: The Broker-Dealer Standard of Conduct, 84 Fed. Reg. 
at 33319 (“Retail customers with limited investment assets may benefit from broker-dealer 
recommendations when they do not qualify for advisory accounts because they do not meet 
the account minimums often imposed by investment advisers.”). 
 127. Id. at 33320. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Form CRS Relationship Summary; Amendment to Form ADV, 84 Fed. Reg. 33492, 
33492 (July 12, 2019) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249, 275, and 279). 
 130. Commission Interpretation Regarding Standard of Conduct for Investment Advisers, 
84 Fed. Reg. 33669, 33669 (July 12, 2019) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 276). 
 131. Regulation Best Interest: The Broker-Dealer Standard of Conduct, 84 Fed. Reg. at 
33321. 
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2.  Care Obligation 
The broker-dealer is required to use “reasonable diligence, care, 
and skill when making a recommendation to a retail customer.”132  The 
risk and potential return of the recommended investment products must 
be considered in light of the client’s investment objectives, along with 
any other reasonable investment alternatives that could fit the client’s 
needs.133 
3.  Conflict of Interest Obligation 
The broker-dealer “must establish, maintain, and enforce 
reasonably designed written policies and procedures addressing conflicts 
of interest associated with its recommendation to retail customers.”134  
This prong of the General Obligation harkens back to some of the chief 
goals of the DOL fiduciary rule, as it requires disclosure of “sales 
contests, sales quotas, bonuses, and non-cash compensation”135 that 
might sway broker-dealers to place their own financial interests above 
those of the client seeking advice.136  
4.  Compliance Obligation 
The broker-dealer “must also establish, maintain, and enforce 
written policies and procedures reasonably designed to achieve 
compliance with Regulation Best Interest as a whole.”137  This 
component of the SEC package is designed to tie together adequate 
compliance with all aspects of new rules, not just a selected few.138 
 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. See id. (“[A] broker-dealer’s policies and procedures must address not only conflicts 
of interest but also compliance with its Disclosure and Care Obligations under Regulation 
Best Interest.”). 
2020] FIDUCIARIES AND BEST INTERESTS 259 
C. Reaction to the SEC Package 
The reaction to the SEC package has been a practical mirror 
image of the reaction received by the fiduciary rule.139  As the details of 
the proposed SEC package became public, Senator Warren criticized the 
proposal for what she perceived to be its failure to adequately shield 
consumers from unscrupulous financial advisers.140  She pointed to the 
discrepancies between the package and the DOL fiduciary rule, such as 
the package’s failure to definitively place broker-dealers under a 
fiduciary standard.141  Instead, the package places broker-dealers under a 
vaguely defined “best interest standard.”142  She advocated that the SEC 
outright ban the types of incentives that she asserted were the “source”143 
of conflicted advice, such as competitions fostered by the financial 
services companies among their broker-dealers.144  Finally, she took issue 
with the fact that, under the SEC package, there was no private right of 
action supplied to investors to sue their broker-dealers.145  In her view, 
the legal remedies available to consumers—FINRA arbitration 
proceedings or independent SEC enforcement—were not sufficient to 
discourage broker-dealers from pushing the boundaries of appropriate 
behavior with their investors.146  These concerns are shared by consumer 
and investor advocacy groups.147 
Conversely, several Republican members of Congress expressed 
to Chairman Clayton their approval of the SEC’s collaboration with the 
financial industry to protect investors from possible conflicts of interest 
 
 139. See Press Release, Bates Group, SEC Adopts Regulation Best Interest: Early 
Reaction and Its Impact (June 13, 2019), https://www.batesgroup.com/news/sec-adopts-
regulation-best-interest-early-reaction-and-its-impact [https://perma.cc/H5UR-F3W9] 
(stating the different reactions to the package, both from different advocacy groups and the 
SEC Commissioners themselves). 
 140. Elizabeth A. Warren, Worried About Wall Street Conflicts? The SEC Isn’t, 
BLOOMBERG: OPINION (Aug. 3, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-
08-03/worried-about-wall-street-conflicts-the-sec-isn-t [https://perma.cc/JVA2-U9G8]. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. See Sarah O’Brien, SEC Adopts Rule to Protect Ordinary Investors, but Critics Say 
It’s Too Lax, CNBC (June 5, 2019, 12:20 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/06/05/sec-
adopts-rule-to-protect-ordinary-investors-critics-say-its-too-lax.html 
[https://perma.cc/Q2LU-WTKR] (“The obligation to act in the best interests of the customer 
in the regulation simply codifies the obligation to make recommendations that are ‘consistent 
with the investor’s best interests.’”). 
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while simultaneously maximizing the menu of investment options 
advisers can offer.148  Industry advocates such as the United States 
Chamber of Commerce149—the same group who headed the effort to 
invalidate the fiduciary rule—also applauded the SEC package for its 
balancing efforts.150 
There are efforts currently underway in Congress to block the 
SEC from enforcing the new package of rules.151  The House of 
Representatives, acting on an amendment sponsored by Maxine Waters, 
the Chairwoman of the House Financial Services Committee, voted to 
prohibit the SEC from using congressionally appropriated funds to 
enforce the new package.152  While not expected to be signed into law by 
the Trump Administration, the amendment signals the hostility to the 
SEC package held by congressional Democrats and a view that might be 
held by a future Democratic president with the ability to appoint his or 
her desired commissioners to the SEC.153  The amendment, in addition to 
being opposed by all House Republicans—and even a few 
Democrats154—is criticized by the Securities Industry and Financial 
Markets Association (“SIFMA”)155 as an unjustified attempt to halt the 
 
 148. See Members of Congress, Comment Letter on SEC’s Proposed Regulation Best 
Interest (Aug. 8, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-07-18/s70718-4201409-
172824.pdf [https://perma.cc/9RQL-3LM4] (“[W]e believe it is critical to maintain multiple 
business models based on the needs and preferences of an investor over their lifetime.”). 
 149. See Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, Comment Letter on 
SEC’s Proposed Regulation Best Interest (May 16, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-
07-18/s70718-5528937-185232.pdf [https://perma.cc/W7GN-NQM3] (pointing to the SEC 
package’s preservation of “the transaction-based payment models for financial services that 
better serve the needs of the consumers, especially those with small account balances” as a 
positive aspect of the SEC package). 
 150. See O’Brien, supra note 147 (“Supporters of the rule say it will be an improvement 
over current standards for brokers, which only require them to make sure an investment is 
‘suitable’ for a client.”). 
 151. Sarah O’Brien, House Passes Bill That Would Block Enforcement of SEC Investor 
Protection Rule, CNBC (June 26, 2019 3:59 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/06/26/house-
passes-bill-blocking-enforcement-of-sec-investor-protection-rule.html 
[https://perma.cc/UYA3-GANV]. 
 152. Brian Croce, House Passes Amendment to Block Reg BI, but Senate Not Likely to 
Follow, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS (June 26, 2019, 3:53 PM), 
https://www.pionline.com/legislation/house-passes-amendment-block-reg-bi-senate-not-
likely-follow [https://perma.cc/2A3B-E9E4]. 
 153. See id. (“[T]he amendment will not be signed into law and mainly serves as a 
messaging piece.”). 
 154. H.R. 3351, 116th Cong. (1st Sess. 2019). 
 155. SIFMA is described as “the leading trade association for broker-dealers, investment 
banks, and asset managers operating in the U.S. and global capital markets.”  About SIFMA, 
SIFMA, https://www.sifma.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/6GGA-N2ZT] (last visited Feb. 7, 
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implementation and enforcement of the SEC package.156  SIFMA praised 
the new package as “the most comprehensive enhancement of standard 
of conduct rules governing broker-dealers since the enactment of the 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.”157 
Also, in September 2019, several states158 and the District of 
Columbia challenged159 the SEC package as a violation of federal law160 
and, as a result “arbitrary, capricious, [and] an abuse of discretion 
. . . .”161  Specifically, the lawsuit alleges that the SEC violated its 
directions in the Dodd-Frank Act where it was instructed to do the 
following:  
 
harmonize the standards that apply to broker-dealers and 
investment advisers . . . and [to provide] that ‘the 
standard of conduct for all brokers, dealers, and 
investment advisers, when providing personalized 
investment advice about securities to retail customers . . . 
shall be to act in the best interest of the customer without 
regard to the financial or other interest of the broker, 
dealer, or investment adviser providing the advice.162 
 
This litigation provides another example—just as the lawsuit163 
that challenged and eventually defeated the fiduciary rule—of the degree 
to which the fight over how to address the issue of conflicted financial 
advice has become so politicized and divisive.164  The lawsuit, should it 
 
 156. Press Release, Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n., Waters Amendment to Defund Reg 
BI Would Undermine Inv’r Prot. (June 25, 2019), 
https://www.sifma.org/resources/news/waters-amendment-to-defund-reg-bi-would-
undermine-investor-protection/ [https://perma.cc/Z9MB-9LD8]. 
 157. Id. 
 158. New York, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, New Mexico, and Oregon. 
Dave Michaels, Seven States Sue SEC on Concern Broker Rule Is Weak, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 
9, 2019, 11:31 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/seven-states-sue-sec-on-concern-broker-
rule-is-weak-11568085859 [https://perma.cc/UVM5-WAK9]. 
 159. State v. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, No. cv-08365-VM (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2019). 
 160. See Dodd-Frank §§ 913 (g)(1)–(2), 124 Stat. 1828-29 (2010) (detailing the provisions 
granting the SEC the authority to create matching standards of conduct for broker-dealers and 
investment advisers). 
 161. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 3–4, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 
No. cv-08365-VM. 
 162. Id. at 2–3. 
 163. U.S. Chamber of Commerce v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 885 F.3d 360 (5th Cir. 2018). 
 164. See Michaels, supra note 158 (looking at the current lawsuit against the SEC package 
and the history of litigation surrounding investment advice). 
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succeed in its mission to void the SEC package, would have the effect of 
returning the regulatory landscape in the financial advice industry to its 
pre-fiduciary rule status after ten years of fighting in Washington, D.C.165  
Therefore, even if the SEC package has set the proper standards of care 
for broker-dealers and investment advisers, the politicization of this issue 
makes it unlikely that the SEC package will withstand the test of time.166 
V.  STATE INVESTOR PROTECTION LAWS 
In light of the uncertainty and legal limbo generated by the 
fiduciary rule and SEC package, multiple states have taken it upon 
themselves to enact legislation or regulations to address the issue of 
conflicting retirement advice.167  Each state that elects to implement its 
own investor protection laws  and regulations must ensure that the 
policies are not preempted by federal legislation, either expressly or 
implicitly.168  Legal challenges could arise to state investor protection 
laws on the grounds that the National Securities Market Improvement Act 
(“NSMIA”)169 expressly preempts these types of state policies.170  The 
SEC package could also be construed to implicitly preempt any new state 
policies that aim to achieve the same goals that the SEC package was 
meant to tackle.171 
Four states in particular have advanced, in varying stages, 
legislation or regulation to attempt to fill the void left by the vacation of 
the DOL fiduciary rule: New Jersey, Massachusetts, Nevada, and New 
 
 165. See generally Makini Brice, Seven U.S. States, District of Columbia Sue to Block SEC 
Rule Change, REUTERS (Sept. 9, 2019, 10:16 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-
sec-bestinterest/seven-u-s-states-district-of-columbia-sue-to-block-sec-rule-change-
idUSKCN1VV04T [https://perma.cc/XR6T-JYUW] (describing the lawsuit challenging the 
SEC package). 
 166. See Croce, supra note 152 (foreshadowing a potential attempt to alter the SEC 
package should the presidency return to Democratic control). 
 167. See The Pros and Cons of State Fiduciary Rules, INVESTMENTNEWS (June 22, 2019, 
6:00 AM), https://www.investmentnews.com/article/20190622/FREE/190629990/the-pros-
and-cons-of-state-fiduciary-rules [https://perma.cc/6CML-QJQF] (discussing the potential 
coexistence of federal and state investor protection rules). 
 168. DAVID C. BOCH & JASON S. PINNEY, MORGAN LEWIS, SIFMA REGULATION BEST 
INTEREST SEMINAR 6–9, (July 10, 2019), https://www.morganlewis.com/-
/media/files/publication/presentation/seminar/2019/outline-for-panel-discussion-on-whats-
next-state-fiduciary-rules-and-preemption.ashx [https://perma.cc/27EL-7BRL]. 
 169. National Securities Market Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 
3416 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (2006)). 
 170. BOCH & PINNEY, supra note 168, at 6–7. 
 171. Id. 
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York.172  The inception of these state laws and regulations that strongly 
mirror the federal fiduciary rule has introduced several issues which the 
financial advisory industry will have to address, besides the unanswered 
question of possible preemption.173  The following subsections detail 
these individual efforts by states to strengthen investor protections, along 
with the early reactions to these regulatory efforts. 
A. New Jersey 
In April 2019, the state announced the implementation of a 
“fiduciary duty”174 that would apply to broker-dealers, investment 
advisers, and investment adviser representatives.175  The proposed 
regulation, promulgated in response to the 2018 elimination of the DOL 
fiduciary rule, requires an adviser acting as a fiduciary to not “subordinate 
clients’ interests to its own,” to act with “loyalty and care,” and to “fully 
disclose to its clients all material facts relating to the conflict [of interest, 
if any].”176   
Industry advocates lobbied for the state regulations to be 
suspended until the results of the new SEC rule are able to be quantified 
and analyzed.177  The industry advocates first assert that competing state 
and federal regulations will only add to the confusion of both investors 
and financial professionals.178  They also raise the issue of investors’ 
 
 172. See Ian Wenik, The States Setting up Their Own Fiduciary Rules, CITYWIRE (Mar. 
13, 2019), https://citywireusa.com/registered-investment-advisor/news/the-states-setting-up-
their-own-fiduciary-rules/a1209414?i=8 [https://perma.cc/D9M5-SSWD] (listing the states 
that have thus far implemented or announced laws and rules that pertain to investor protection 
and the fiduciary status of financial advisers). 
 173. See James F. Jorden, INSIGHT: SEC ‘Best Interest’ Rule and Proposed State 
Fiduciary Rules–Common Law and Preemption Tests, BLOOMBERG (June 28, 2019, 4:00 
AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/securities-law/insight-sec-best-interest-rule-and-
proposed-state-fiduciary-rules-common-law-and-preemption-tests [https://perma.cc/3GGL-
3HTC] (“Efforts by state regulators to adopt a sales conduct model based on the ‘fiduciary’ 
standards in the DOL’s rule would result in a patchwork of different standards (and different, 
uncharted boundaries for conduct) that run afield of traditional common law definitions.”). 
 174. Fiduciary Duty of Broker-Dealers, Agents, Investment Advisers, and Investment 
Adviser Representatives, 51 N.J.R. 493(a) (proposed Apr. 15, 2019). 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Mark Schoeff Jr., New Jersey Fiduciary Rule: Pressure Leads to Public Hearing, 
Comment Deadline Extension, INVESTMENTNEWS (July 17, 2019, 2:22 PM) [hereinafter 
Schoeff Jr., New Jersey Fiduciary Rule], 
https://www.investmentnews.com/article/20190617/FREE/190619935/new-jersey-fiduciary-
rule-pressure-leads-to-public-hearing-comment [https://perma.cc/C2GU-ZFCR]. 
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moving from state to state as possibly providing yet another obstacle to 
investors’ having a clear idea on the standard of care that is required of 
the financial advisor they have chosen.179  On the other hand, proponents 
of the state rule point to the alleged failure of the SEC package to 
adequately shield investors from conflicting investment advice and that 
the state regulation will impose upon financial professionals the 
necessary fiduciary standard.180  The state argues that the SEC package 
is not on par with regulations that impose a fiduciary duty and that the 
new state rule can coexist with the SEC package.181   
B. Massachusetts 
In June 2019, the state proposed a “fiduciary conduct standard” 
for all broker-dealers, agents, investment advisers, and investment 
adviser representatives in their interactions with customers and clients.182  
The Massachusetts Secretary of State designed the standard so that the 
state’s financial advisers would be required to act in “the best interest of 
customers and clients, without regard to the interests of the broker-dealer, 
advisory firm and its personnel.”183  The Secretary based the new 
standard on the “common law fiduciary duties of care and loyalty.”184  
The proposed regulation would apply to recommendations, advice, and 
the selection of account types.185   
 
 179. Bernice Napach, Brokerage Industry Blasts NJ Fiduciary Rule at Hearing, 
THINKADVISOR (July 18, 2019, 3:49 PM), 
https://www.thinkadvisor.com/2019/07/18/brokerage-industry-blasts-nj-fiduciary-rule-at-
hearing/ [https://perma.cc/DY88-JXN6] (describing some of the complaints of the financial 
services industry over the proposed New Jersey rule, including one wealth advisor who said, 
“If our advice and our services have to vary from state to state, it will be very confusing to 
our clients and will require very substantial increased costs that they should not have to bear” 
in protest of the propposal). 
 180. Schoeff Jr., New Jersey Fiduciary Rule, supra note 177. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Press Release, Sec’y of the Commonwealth of Mass., Preliminary Solicitation of 
Public Comments: Fiduciary Conduct Standard for Broker-Dealers, Agents, Investment 
Advisers, and Investment Adviser Representatives (June 14, 2019), 
https://www.sec.state.ma.us/sct/sctfiduciaryconductstandard/fiduciaryconductstandardidx.ht
m [https://perma.cc/K4ED-2QLF]. 
 183. Melanie Waddell, Galvin Proposes Fiduciary Rule in Massachusetts, THINKADVISOR 
(June 14, 2019, 4:06 PM), https://www.thinkadvisor.com/2019/06/14/galvin-proposes-
fiduciary-rule-in-massachusetts/ [https://perma.cc/AH3V-HEYY]. 
 184. Id.; see Fiduciary, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining the term to 
mean a person holding the character of a trustee, or a character analogous to that of a trustee, 
in respect to the trust and confidence involved in it and the scrupulous good faith and candor 
which it requires). 
 185. Press Release, Sec’y of the Commonwealth of Mass., supra note 182. 
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The state asserted that the SEC package has failed to properly 
define the term “best interest” and thus left investors exposed to the 
potential pitfalls of conflicted investment advice.186  Like the New Jersey 
proposal, industry advocates such as SIFMA worry this proposal will 
generate confusion both among investors over the standard of care to 
which their adviser is held and among advisers over how to comply with 
competing federal and state regulatory frameworks.187  These concerns, 
in addition to the added compliance cost, are the industry’s reasons for 
requesting that the state hold off on implementing its own fiduciary rule 
until the SEC package can be allowed to take effect.188 
C. Nevada 
In June 2017, then-Governor of Nevada Brian Sandoval signed a 
mandate189 that imposed on all Nevada financial planners a “duty of a 
fiduciary toward a client.”190  The law requires planners to disclose “any 
gain the financial planner may receive, such as profit or commission, if 
[the planner’s] advice is followed.”191  Crucially, the law also grants 
clients a right to sue financial planners who do any of the following: “(a) 
violate[s] any element of his or her fiduciary duty; (b) was grossly 
negligent in selecting the course of action advised, in light of all the 
client’s circumstances known to the financial planner; or (c) violated any 
law of [Nevada] in recommending the investment or service.”192 
In January 2019, the Nevada Secretary of State announced 
proposed regulations to implement the 2017 law.193  The proposed 
regulations impose a fiduciary duty on all broker-dealers or sales 
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 187. See Press Release, SIFMA, Comments on Massachusetts Fiduciary Rule Proposal 
(July 26, 2019),  https://www.sifma.org/resources/news/sifma-comments-on-massachusetts-
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while continuing to have access to the numerous choices and opportunities they have today.”). 
 188. Id. 
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GREENSFELDER, HEMKER & GALE, P.C. (June 2017), 
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duty-on-broker-dealers.html [https://perma.cc/EFJ4-S7X5]. 
 190. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 628A.020 (2018). 
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 192. § 628A.030. 
 193. Press Release, Sec’y of State of the State of Nev., Notice of Draft Regulations and 
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representatives who: “(a) provide investment advice; (b) perform 
discretionary trading; (c)  maintain assets under management; (d) act in a 
fiduciary capacity towards the client; (e) disclose fees or gains; (f) 
through the completion of any contract; and (g) through the term of 
engagement of services.”194  Broker-dealers and sales representatives 
who engage in the following activities are exempted from an ongoing 
fiduciary duty; rather, they owe the customer a fiduciary only relating to 
the specific transaction at hand: 
1. The broker-dealer does not manage client’s 
assets; 
2. The broker-dealer does not create periodic 
financial plans for the client, provide ongoing 
investment advice or enter into a contract to 
provide investment advice; 
3. The broker-dealer does not perform discretionary 
trading for the client; and 
4. The broker-dealer has not otherwise developed a 
fiduciary duty with the client. 195 
Multiple financial services firms oppose the proposed 
regulations, saying that they will either be forced to stop offering retail 
brokerage in the state or that investment options will be strictly limited.196  
The North American Securities Administrator Association 
(“NASAA”),197 an advocate for state securities regulators, has come out 
on the other side of those financial services firms and groups like 
SIFMA.198  NASAA argues that the securities industry is able to handle 
these complex changes in the regulatory environment and that state 
regulation can coexist with the SEC package.199  There is early evidence 
that demonstrates the effectiveness that this type of proper, tailored 
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regulation can have on accomplishing the goal that federal and state 
regulators have been aiming for: the protection of investors from 
unethical and improper actions by investment advisers.200 
D. New York 
There are currently efforts underway in the New York legislature 
to impose a fiduciary standard on all financial advisers operating within 
the state’s borders.201  The rationale behind the idea is similar to that of 
New Jersey’s proposed investor protection laws: the SEC package does 
not go far enough to shield investors from potential predatory 
practices.202  This follows the successful implementation of a state 
regulation that required financial services professionals who advise on 
insurance and annuity products act in the consumer’s best interests and 
not allow external incentives to cloud their advice.203 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
One of the criticisms of Dodd-Frank was that it was far too broad 
and that it instituted cumbersome restrictions on financial institutions that 
were not equipped to deal with such regulation.204  The main objection 
was that the financial world is not a monolith in which all financial 
institutions are created equal.205  The same principle can be applied to the 
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financial advice industry, where there is a wide disparity in the amount 
of advice consumers require, the types of financial advisers available, and 
the methods in which advisers are compensated.206  A tailored approach 
to this problem of balancing the interests of investors and advisers alike 
is the only way to ensure stability and fairness in the field.207 
A feasible approach is to dial back federal involvement in the 
investment advice industry and allow states to experiment with different 
levels of regulation to achieve the proper balance between investor 
protection and giving financial advisers flexibility to serve their clients’ 
best interest.208  As Justice Louis Brandeis famously wrote: “[A] state 
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and 
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”209  Senator 
Richard Shelby pointed to the success of state regulators in a 2004 
hearing on the topic of conflicts of interest in the mutual funds industry: 
 
Much of the Committee’s attention has been focused on 
. . . the revelations of wrongdoing in the mutual fund 
industry. These scandals had much in common: They 
both involved egregious conflicts of interest, widespread 
misconduct, and inadequate disclosure to investors. 
There was another common theme underlying these 
scandals: State securities regulators initiated both 
investigations. Although the SEC is the primary securities 
market regulator, time and again we have seen the need 
for vigorous State regulators to pursue investigations and 
enforcement actions . . . State regulators are the local 
cops on the beat, and their proximity to investors enables 
them to serve as an early detection system for growing 
frauds and scams . . . Many states have proactively 
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launched initiatives designed to preempt future frauds by 
educating investors as to how they can protect their assets 
and to identify signs of wrongdoing . . . .210 
 
The debate over investor protection, should it keep festering in 
Washington D.C., could make it highly politicized like immigration211 
and health care law.212  Evidence of a partisan divide over how to properly 
regulate financial advisers has become apparent over the past decade, 
from the successful lawsuit213 against the fiduciary rule, championed by 
pro-business groups, to the current litigation214 challenging the SEC 
package, spearheaded by eight Democratic Attorneys General.215  
In addition to the SEC package, state laws and regulations, and 
current litigation, there is also the possibility that the DOL will come out 
with new regulations that deal with the standards of conduct that relate to 
retirement accounts.216  The financial advisory industry has undergone a 
period of massive change along with rest of the financial and banking 
systems since Dodd-Frank was enacted in 2010.217  Allowing states like 
Nevada218 to implement their own investor protection laws could lead to 
one state’s striking the right balance between the interest of the financial 
industry and investors, at which point the federal government could 
attempt to model its own relevant regulations after those states that have  
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yielded positive reactions from industry and investor advocates.219 
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